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Abstract—Many adult content websites incorporate social net-
working features. Although these are popular, they raise signif-
icant challenges, including the potential for users to “catfish”,
i.e., to create fake profiles to deceive other users. This paper
takes an initial step towards automated catfish detection. We
explore the characteristics of the different age and gender groups,
identifying a number of distinctions. Through this, we train
models based on user profiles and comments, via the ground
truth of specially verified profiles. Applying our models for age
and gender estimation of unverified profiles, we identify 38%
of profiles who are likely lying about their age, and 25% who
are likely lying about their gender. We find that women have a
greater propensity to catfish than men. Further, whereas women
catfish select from a wide age range, men consistently lie about
being younger. Our work has notable implications on operators
of such online social networks, as well as users who may worry
about interacting with catfishes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adult content has been a long standing innovator in tech-
nology. Whereas, originally, online adult content was primarily
distributed via pay-per-view sites and peer-to-peer networks,
we have recently witnessed a radical shift termed “Porn 2.0”
with the integration of diverse features into popular portals,
e.g., videos, images, webcams and chat functionality. For
example, many now support user-generated content (UGC),
as well as video commenting and rating. These services have
exploded in popularity, yet research has not kept pace with
their advancement.
One of the most powerful features introduced is that of
online social networking (OSNs). Adult OSNs, much like
Facebook, allow users to create and interconnect social pro-
files. Anecdotally, these profiles have led to a plethora of fake
accounts created by users in an attempt to deceive others re-
garding their true identity — so called “catfishing” [1]. In this
paper, we restrict ourselves to two forms of identity deception:
users lying about either their gender or age (or both). Although
we do not take a moral position about catfishing and perhaps
in many cases it does not harm users, there is also a notable
subset of situations in which such fake accounts could directly
damage others (or themselves). For example, catfishes may
pretend to be younger than their true age in an attempt to
attract partners; similarly, younger users may pretend to be
older to avoid legal age filters. Alternatively, men may pretend
to be (homosexual) women in an attempt to garner more
female friends [2]. Indeed, our exploration of one such Porn
2.0 OSN userbase reveals that certain demographics do excel
in terms of popularity metrics (§IV), potentially motivating
deceit. Thus, any mechanism to detect such deception would
have significant value to both the OSN operators and users
concerned about being deceived.
In this paper we ask to what extent does catfishing occur,
and also is it possible to automatically detect them? To answer
this, we study the PornHub adult OSN, one of the largest
and most popular Porn 2.0 portals in the world. We have
crawled the Pornhub website recording all data from 99,727
OSN profiles (§III). PornHub incorporates some of the most
sophisticated social networking features seen in the domain,
including the ability to form friendships, upload and share
content, send messages and post on each others’ “walls”. This
makes it ideal as a case-study for analysis.
A particularly novel feature of PornHub is the ability to
create “verified” profiles that are manually checked by Porn-
Hub employees. This gives a unique ground-truth of accurate
profiles that is useful for our purpose. Using this data, we
first characterise the activities of these different genders and
age groups to observe notable differences (§IV). With these
analyses, we move on to explore several algorithms to detect
users lying about their age and/or gender (§V). As an input
we utilise profile features and the comments left by users.
Using well recognised state-of-the-art techniques [3], [4], and
with additional set of features we propose, we build models
to predict true user demographics (gender and age) based on
these inputs.
With this subset of catfish profiles, we then begin to
explore their characteristics (§VI). Although our focus is not
to discover the unique reasoning behind catfishing, our results
do shed light on some of the benefits. We compute popularity
metrics (e.g., number of friends) for catfishes to find that
they tend to gain larger friendship and subscription groups.
Although this metric may be skewed by the possibility of
catfishes being more proactive in befriending others, we also
note that catfishes gain more profile views as well (a metric
which is more difficult to game as it depends on others
choosing to visit your page). We surmise that the increasing
integration of our offline and online personas will result in this
becoming even more important (§VII). Of course, although
catfish detection may be more explicitly required in adult
portals, our methods will also have benefits for various other
services, e.g., online dating and mentorship.
The contributions and roadmap of this work is as follows:
• We present the first work to explore and quantify the
presence of catfishes on adult OSNs (§IV), making our
dataset available for public use1 (§III).
• We build classifiers for age estimation and gender predic-
tion for adult OSN users, and compare various features
for achieving the best performance (§V).
• We profile the demographics and activities of catfish
users, highlighting how they differ from truthful users,
and benefit from their deception (§VI).
II. RELATED WORK
Pornography is anecdotally the most searched for content
on the web. Whereas work has gone into understanding the
sociological aspects of sexual activities [5], [6], little is known
about the online engines that enable its distribution, especially
the expanding “Porn 2.0” phenomenon. Numerous YouTube-
like websites have emerged (e.g., PornHub, YouPorn), with
in-built social features. Recent work [7] recorded over 60
billion views on one such Porn 2.0 website, whilst another
study found that some adult video sites can even exceed the
traffic footprint of traditional video sites [8].
A novel requirement that stands out in this domain is the
need for robust demographics verification. This is particularly
driven by the potential incentives for people to deceive others
about their true gender and age. There have been a number
of recent studies looking at the automated verification of
demographics [9], [10], [11]. For instance, [3], [12] utilised
textual features including text content, part-of-speech (POS)
tags, and discourse styles to train a model using linear regres-
sion for age prediction. They tested their approach on three
different collections including online forums. They managed
to achieve an age prediction with correlation 0.535 and mean-
absolute-error (MAE) in age of 6.5 years. In an extension to
their work [4], they applied their methods on Twitter data,
and achieved a MAE of 4.1, which was shown to be better
than human estimation of age. In another study, [13] utilised
profile and network information for age and gender prediction.
The results show that network information leads to significant
improvement in prediction, and they explain it as a reason
of the principle of homophily of Twitter users. Unlike the
above studies, We do not strive to make a contribution to
the algorithmic detection of users lying about demographics.
Instead, we exploit these existing state-of-the-art methods and
apply them to this new and important domain. This is a
topic of increasing importance, with countries such as the UK
proposing mandatory age-checks for such websites [14].
1Link to be provided in final version
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no prior work
focusing on demographic verification within the adult domain,
although various works have focused on related components
of Porn 2.0, such as pornographic practices, communities and
subcultures [15]; interest recommendations [16]; dating ser-
vices [17], [18]; user commenting [19]; content popularity [20]
and illegal content dissemination [21]. The closest to our work
is a recent study of the PornHub social network [2], although
it did not touch upon age verification.
A number of studies have also looked at online gender
swapping more generally [22]. For example, [23], [24] found
that gender swapping in online gaming is commonplace.
The reasons for such activities have also been explored via
surveys [25]. Reasons given include: (i) curiosity and the
desire to experiment; (ii) the perception that the opposite
gender is treated better; and (iii) the belief that playing the
opposite gender will allow new forms of behaviour, or gain
advantages. This complements our own work, although we do
not focus on finding the reasons for users to catfish.
III. METHODOLOGY & DATA
A. Data Collection
PornHub is a video sharing website that allows users to
upload and view adult content, much like YouTube. It also
has a built-in OSN, allowing users to create profiles and
form social connections (friendships and subscriptions) with
each other. They can exchange private messages, upload/share
videos and pictures and post on each others’ “walls”.
We have scraped the associated OSN profiles attached to
PornHub. To initiate the crawl, we used the search facilities
on PornHub to retrieve all users from the 60 largest cities
within the US, as well as 48 capital cities selected around the
world, e.g., Beijing, Berlin, London, New York, Tokyo, etc.
Starting from this seed set, we performed a breadth-first crawl
(traversing friendship links). If not already available, we also
collected the account information for any users who had left a
comment on another user’s wall. In total, we collected 99,727
profiles. In each profile, where available, we recorded user age,
gender, sexual preference, their “wall” of comments, number
of profile views, number of videos that they have watched, and
their social relationships. Figure 1 presents a sample account
from our data collection showing the information gathered for
each account. User IDs in our collection were anonymised to
protect users’ privacy.
We collect two profile types. The most populated is what
we term “unverified”, which any user can set up without
any pre-requisites (e.g., verification, payment). These accounts
constitute 94.5% of all users. There is, however, a special
form of user account, called “verified”. These accounts have
been manually validated by PornHub; this involves taking a
picture of oneself with some message that links the individual
to the account (e.g., next to their username). Although not
foolproof, it does lend a far higher level of user trust in profile
details (particularly gender and age) than typical. To increase
our number of verified profiles, we specifically searched for
all verified profiles in the above cities, and scraped their
<USER>
<ID>8423012381</ID>
<TYPE>0</TYPE> <!-- 1 for verified accounts -->
<AGE>27</AGE>
<PROFILE>Girl,Single,Girls,united%states</PROFILE> <!-- gender, status, interested in, 
country -->
<ACTIVITY>7611,202</ACTIVITY> <!-- #videos watched, #posts -->
<FRIENDS>1350,594,76,680</FRIENDS> <!-- #total friends, males, females, others -->
<SUBSCRIBERS>605,246,25,334</SUBSCRIBERS> <!-- same as above -->
<SUBSCRIBEDTO>106,40,7,59</SUBSCRIBEDTO> <!-- same as above -->
<NCOMMENTS>11,10,87,54</NCOMMENTS> <!-- #comments, #unique comments, #words, #unique 
words -->
<COMMENTS>
<comment count=2>thanx sugar</comment>
<comment count=1>I can definitely say the same! You are damn sexy!</comment>
<comment count=1>Awwwww you guys are so sweet to this poor horny girl!!!</comment>
<comment count=1>Thanx you all are real sweet</comment>
<comment count=1>Mmmmmm PLEASE!!!!</comment>
<comment count=1>Well thank you sugar!</comment>
<comment count=1>Ohhh yeah I think I could</comment>
<comment count=1>Heheheehehe thanx sugar!</comment>
<comment count=1>No problem...my pleasure in fact!</comment>
<comment count=1>Damn you are one fine woman!!!! *kiss kiss*</comment>
<comment count=1>GRRRR I NEED SOMEONE XXXXXX MY XXXX AND XXX RIGHT NOW!!!</comment>
</COMMENTS>
</USER>
Fig. 1: A sample account in the collected data. Pornographic terms are replaced by X’s.
accounts. Overall, 5.5% of the accounts crawled were verified
(5,484 accounts in total). Despite being a smaller sample
size, verified accounts offer a more reliable view of dedicated
users, providing a form of (partial) ground truth against which
statistics about unverified accounts can be compared. We later
exploit these “groundtruth” verified accounts to train models
that can be used to classify the remaining unverified accounts.
B. Limitations & Ethical Considerations
Before continuing, it is important to recognise the limita-
tions of our data. First, we acknowledge that the PornHub
userbase is not necessarily representative of the wider popu-
lation. Hence, our results are specific to the PornHub social
network. That said, we posit that building catfish detection
methods must be specific to individual platforms, and therefore
we do not view this as a concern.
Second, we later utilise verified profiles to train age and
gender prediction models (for use on unverified profiles). An
obvious possibility is that the verified profiles and unverified
profiles are sufficiently different to make comparability diffi-
cult. Although this is a theoretical possibility, our extensive
manual inspections have not suggested this is the case. On
more practical grounds, we also note that this is the only vi-
able near-groundtruth dataset available in the domain. Hence,
although the data likely contains noise, we are confident it
is not sufficiently significant to undermine our overall results
and trends. Further exploration and validation is a major theme
within our future work.
Finally, it is important to note that we are collecting personal
information about a large number of users. Hence, we took
a number of steps to address ethical concerns. We avoided
analysing personally identifiable information, e.g., names. We
also ensured that our methodology did not involve any commu-
nications with the accounts under study. Critically, PornHub
allows users to set their profiles to either public or private. Our
data is exclusively made-up of users who have set their profiles
to public (i.e., anyone can view them). We did not make any
attempt to access private profiles, which would have involved
befriending others.
IV. CHARACTERISING PORNHUB DEMOGRAPHICS
Before exploring the presence of catfishes, we briefly char-
acterise the demographic make-up of PornHub accounts. We
include both verified and unverified accounts in this analysis,
but we ignore accounts labelled as “couple”, “company”,
“transgender”, or “not specified”’ (these collectively make just
4.4% of all accounts) to focus on catfishing in the context of
male and female accounts. Note that we interchangeably use
the terms ‘girl’ / ‘guy’ and female / male as these are the
terms used on the portal.
Figure 2 presents a histogram revealing the number of
accounts of each age. 64% of accounts fall into the 18–
30 bracket, confirming a young demographic. Perhaps more
noteworthy is the distinction between male and female ac-
counts, with female users marginally younger (average of 28
vs. 31). This is driven by a larger population of older male
profiles. This could perhaps be explained by that fact that
younger women have shown greater affinity to pornographic
content (compared to older), whilst men continue to maintain
an interest into older years [26].
As well as being able to stipulate their own gender, profiles
can also list which other gender(s) they are interested in.
Figure 3 presents the number of accounts that stipulate an
interest in each gender (male, female, both). We find that 68%
of accounts are interested in women (bottom middle plot) of
which 90% are heterosexual males, yet only 4.5% of accounts
(top right plot) are females interested in males who could
satisfy this need. In fact, female accounts are more likely to
Fig. 2: Distribution of male and female profiles across age
ranges
Fig. 3: Distribution of male and female users interested in
men, women and both across age ranges
stipulate an interest in both, rather than men alone. In other
words, PornHub suffers from a significant supply-and-demand
mismatch: Female profiles are in high demand, yet only a
small proportion of profiles can satisfy this demand.
To explore this further, we look at the number of friends
garnered per user for both female and male accounts (Fig-
ure 4). Profiles labelled as female consistently obtain larger
social groups than male ones: an average of 396 vs. 185. A
downward trend can also be observed across the age ranges
with younger users gaining more friends, which is again more
pronounced for female accounts. For example, the average 21
year old female accounts gets 433 friends compared to just
176 for a 50 year old female.
Fig. 4: Number of friends per profile vs. reported age
One explanation for the above could be that younger users
are more proactive in befriending others. To explore this,
we inspect the number of subscribers for each account type
(these are equivalent to followers on Twitter, i.e., directed
relationships). Again, we see a strong bias towards female
profiles who, on average, have 309 subscribers vs. just 97
for men. Similarly, the number of friends, on average, for
female accounts is 403 vs. 188 for men. Clearly, the subscriber
numbers are primarily driven by the behaviour of other users
(as a user cannot subscribe to themselves). Hence, this adds
evidence against the claim that young female profiles may get
large social groups simply through proactive befriending other.
In fact, the average female account is subscribed to just 106
channels compared to 142 for male accounts.
In summary, the above confirms a significant difference
between male and female profiles in terms of social popularity
(friendship groups). Our aim is not to speculate on why this is
the case. However, it is clear that these demographic pressures
might create incentives for people to lie about profile details.
Due to this, we spend the rest of the paper exploring the
propensity for users to lie on this social network.
V. DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTION
To identify deceptive users (catfishes), it is first necessary
to extract and predict profile features that indicate true demo-
graphics. To do this, we utilise PornHub’s verified profiles;
these are profiles that have been independently verified by
PornHub. Although an assumption, we are confident that these
are significantly more trustworthy than non-verified accounts,
since they must pass a process of validation by the website.
We therefore use the verified profile data as a training set
for building models for age estimation and gender prediction.
Models are then used to estimate the demographics of the
unverified accounts and compare them to the claimed ones.
It is also worth noting that, theoretically, verified users may
exhibit different characteristics (e.g., activity level, sexual
preferences, education level) to their unverified equivalents,
thereby making their use within the classifier less accurate.
To mitigate this, we only identify users as catfishes when they
exhibit a significant disparity to their predicted demographics.
Regardless, we emphasise that the lack of a groundtruth means
that our results only offer a lower-bound.
A. Feature Extraction
First, a set of features is extracted for training a regression
model for age estimation and a classifier for gender prediction.
Many features are inspired by the state-of-the-art [3], [4], [13];
however, we also introduce a set of novel features that are
specific to our data. The set of feature groups extracted from
the data set are as follows:
Content features: The comments collected for each user’s
profile are used for generating a set of features. Some of
the content features are inspired by [3], while we introduce
an additional one to measure text formality based on the
comments nature on such website:
• Comments-content: a set of features representing the
bag-of-words (BOW) by each user, where each term
represents a binary feature that is set to 1 if appeared
in the user’s comments and zero otherwise.
• Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC): a set
of features representing the percentage of terms used in
user’s comments that have a given LIWC category [27].
This includes: emotions, questions, self reference, family
reference etc. This set of features should show the nature
of terms used by a given user, where it might be a good
indication of the user’s age and/or gender.
• Comments count: This includes, (i) number of com-
ments by the user; (ii) percentage of unique comments,
as we noticed many users repeats their exact comments
on different posts; and (iii) vocabulary variety, which is
the number of unique terms used by the user divided by
the total length of comments.
• Comments-formality: One behaviour that young genera-
tions are commonly characterised by is the usage of slang,
including shortcuts and abbreviations (e.g., “gr8”, “thx”).
We introduced a feature to measure the percentage of
informal language in users’ comments. To detect informal
text, we used the Xerox part of speech tagger (POS)2
to label POS tags of terms in comments. Terms with
an undefined tag were considered informal language.
We found this approach to be accurate in many cases.
However, we noticed that some users use non-English
terms. Thus, we applied the same POS tagger for three
languages: English, French, and German. Those terms
that obtained undefined tags with all three languages
were considered informal. Finally, the feature value is
the number of informal terms divided by the comments
length.
Network features: Another set of features were extracted to
represent non-textual information. Most of these features are
dependent on the network characteristics of PornHub, which
contains more information on individuals than other general
social websites. These features are:
• Profile: including a user’s country, status (single / in a
relationship), and interested in (men / women / both).
• Activity: numbers of videos watched and posted (in log
scale).
• Network: Numbers of friends, subscribers, and sub-
scribed to (in log scale). In addition, percentage of males
and females in each of these lists.
Using the above features, we perform gender and age pre-
diction to identify discrepancies, where users may be exhibit-
ing anomalous behaviour for their stipulated demographics.
B. Gender Prediction
For gender prediction, we train a support vector machine
(SVM) binary classifier [28] using the above features of the
verified accounts. The created model allows us to then classify
the remaining unverified accounts.
2https://open.xerox.com/Services/fst-nlp-tools/
To measure the performance of the built classifier, we used
10-fold cross validation on the verified set. We only focused
on the verified accounts with at least 10 comments in their
profile to avoid training the classifier with samples of sparse
content features. The number of verified accounts with 10+
comments are 1,231 out of which only 1,119 accounts had
their gender identified. Numbers of males and females are 820
and 299 respectively. Precision, recall, and F-measure were
calculated for each gender separately; then macro-F-measure
and accuracy were calculated for the overall performance.
Different combinations of the feature groups were tested to
find the most effective features. Table I reports the results
for gender prediction on the verified accounts. As shown,
network features are more effective than content features in
predicting user’s gender. This is driven by the differences seen
in the popularity of the two genders (§IV). However, when
combining content and network features, significantly better
accuracy (92%) is achieved. We note that the classifier is more
effective in predicting males than females, which is expected
since male training samples are almost three times than of
female samples. Nevertheless, this result is acceptable for the
prediction of unverified accounts for our analysis.
C. Age Estimation
The same set of features has been used for age estimation.
We applied two regression techniques for age estimation;
namely, SVM regression3 and deep neural networks (DNNs).
We have examined different models for SVM, including linear
and polynomial regressions. As for the neural network ap-
proach, we designed a multi-layered perceptron (MLP) trained
to do regression over all the possible age values. The neural
network had 3 hidden layers of rectified linear unit (ReLU)
activated neurons each. This means the activation function for
each neuron was of the form f(x) = max(0, x)
Our experimentation showed that SVM linear regression
achieved the most effective results when compared to the
other non-linear SVM regression models and DNNs. Actually,
DNNs showed the poorest performance, which could be ex-
plained by over-fitting. Unlike SVMs that are resilient to over-
fitting because of their regularization techniques, DNNs are
highly susceptible to over-fitting, especially in situations where
feature dimensionality exceeds training dataset size. This is
because of exponentially higher number of free parameters.
We therefore utilise SVM.
Similar to what we performed in gender prediction, 10-fold
cross-validation was applied on the verified accounts with 10+
comments to evaluate the effectiveness of the features and
regression techniques. All the 1,231 verified accounts with
10+ comments were used, where the input for training the
regression models was the extracted features set, and the label
is the declared age by the verified account. We normalized ages
over 60 to “60+” in order to reduce the sparsity for these ages.
For measuring the performance, we followed the same method
applied in literature [3], [12], [4], where Pearson’s correlation
3http://svmlight.joachims.org/
Features Female Male Macro F1 Accuracy
R P F1 R P F1
Content 0.542 0.885 0.672 0.974 0.854 0.910 0.791 0.859
Network 0.702 0.847 0.768 0.954 0.898 0.925 0.846 0.887
All 0.769 0.920 0.838 0.976 0.921 0.947 0.893 0.920
TABLE I: Gender prediction performance
and mean absolute error (MAE) between estimated age and
actual age are measured.
Features MAE Correlation
Content 5.581 0.509
Network 6.119 0.234
All 5.783 0.440
TABLE II: Age estimation performance (SVM)
The best result we achieved with DNNs was a correlation
of 0.28 and MAE of 6.8 years. This is much lower than
the best results achieved with SVMs. Table II shows the ob-
tained MAE and correlation using different features set when
applying SVM linear regression model for age estimation.
Unlike gender detection, network features are not effective
for age estimation. Actually, it degrades the performance of
content features when added to it. Content features from
users’ comments are the most effective as shown in the table.
The model can estimate the age of an account holder from
his/her comments with an error of ±5 years on average. The
correlation between estimated ages and actual ones is 0.51.
This result compares well with the state-of-the-art methods
on other data sets [3]4
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Next, we utilise our classifiers to explore the unverified users
who are classified as catfishes. We consider a catfish to be ei-
ther: (i) a user who is classified as having a gender different to
the one reported; or (ii) a user with a predicted age that is more
than 5.581 years5 different than their claimed age. Of course,
this definition would also identify some verified accounts as
catfishes in the case of classification errors. Consequently, we
emphasise that our analysis highlights users who are likely to
be catfishes — it is not a groundtruth. Hence, our classifiers
can be used for raising flags to service provider for applying
additional vetting for users with suspicious behaviuor.
For consistency, only unverified accounts with more than
10 comments were considered in our analysis, since our
models were trained in the same way. Thus, the number
of unverified accounts with 10+ comments included in our
upcoming analysis is 11,182.
A. Who catfishes?
We start by inspecting the number of accounts that are
classified as lying about their gender. Figure 5 shows the
4The best result for age estimation achieved in [3] for medical blog users
was a correlation of 0.535 and 6.537 MAE
5Our model achieves a MAE of 5.581. Thus, we cannot consider catfishes
who only marginally change their age.
Fig. 5: The age breakdown for users who lie about their gender
(left) and those who don’t (right).
Fig. 6: The probability density function of difference between
estimated and reported user age, broken down for female and
male accounts.
number of catfishes of either gender and in each age range
(compared to the number of users classified as honest). Note
that in Figure 5, the gender refers to the reported gender listed
on the profile (not the one that was predicted by our classifier).
A key fact emerges from Figure 5 — surprisingly, we find
that a large proportion of female users pretend to be men. Just
35.1% of male accounts are classified as catfishes compared
to 60.7% for women. Although this sounds high, it is roughly
equivalent to prior questionnaire-based results (48% [1]). It is
also worth noting that a similar observation has been made
Fig. 7: Reported age of accounts lying about their age, broken
down by gender.
in online gaming [23], [24]. A major reason for this was the
perception that men are treated differently; we conjecture a
similar motive could be at play here.
We can also inspect accounts that are classified as lying
about their age. Figure 6 present the difference between
reported and predicted ages. It can be seen that catfish accounts
reported as male (right) tend to select a marginally younger
age, but also experiment with far older age ranges. In contrast,
catfish accounts reported as female more consistently select
younger ages. The average age of a male catfish is 38.15,
but just 34.87 for female catfish. This can clearly be seen
in Figure 7, which presents a histogram of the reported ages
for the catfish accounts: Male catfish profiles are more likely
to be older than female catfish profiles. This tendency is
conducive with common social theory; studies have shown
that women are generally interested in same-aged to somewhat
older men, whereas men exhibit preferences towards younger
women [29]. Hence, it seems likely that men pretending to be
women would select young ages, whilst women pretending to
be men would select from a wider range of ages.
B. What are the benefits of catfishing?
An obvious question is what drives users to catfish. Al-
though there are many potential reasons, we have previously
hypothesised that frustrated (unpopular) users may catfish in
an attempt to gain more attention (§IV). This can be measured
using the profile view counter listed on each profile, as well
as the number of friends a profile garners. To inspect this,
Figure 8 plots the number of views vs. the number of friends.
Profiles are separated into catfish (false) and honest (true)
users. It can be seen that honest (true) female accounts gain
by far the most profile views and friend relationships. As the
number of views increase, so does the number of friends.
On average, these female users have 32,150 views and 444
friends. Honest male users, on the other hand, gain just 6,098
views and 195 friends. This is in-line with our earlier analysis.
More interesting, however, is comparing these against users
classified as catfishes. Male catfishes, i.e., male users with a
female account (red line in the right plot), do substantially
better and, in fact, mirror the popularity of women (16590
views and 314 friends on average). In contrast, the average
view count for truthful male profiles is just 6098, while they
gain only 195 friends. Such observations shed light on the
motivation of a male catfish, although we are reticent to say
this is the reason. The situation is very different for female
catfish, i.e., women pretending to be men (red line in the left
plot), who gain far fewer views and friends than their honest
counterparts (8719 and 151 respectively). This is because, to
other users, they will appear to be men. This makes it unlikely
that such users would catfish simply for more attention.
C. What do catfishes want?
We can also decompose the profiles into accounts interested
in each option (men, women, both). This allows us to see what
profiles classified as catfish are typically seeking. Figure 9
plots the number of friends each account accumulated based
Fig. 8: Number of Profile Views for profiles with false and true
genders (smoothed with 95% confidence interval). We use the
classifier to separate accounts into male and female (rather
than using the reported gender).
Fig. 9: The number of friends per account as a proxy gain for
lying about gender, broken down by gender and interest.
on the user’s age. It also breaks users down based on what
they stipulate they are interested in. It can be seen that very
few male profiles register an interest in both genders (8.0%),
whilst this is significantly higher for female accounts (60.5%).
We conjecture this might be because females choose to catfish
so that they can experiment with other women whilst also
interacting with men, whilst men choose to catfish primarily so
they can overcome the difficulty of befriending women. Hence,
male catfishes tend to lie about being homosexual women;
these are actually the users who gain the most (in terms of
increased friendship sizes). This is especially the case for men
aged 30-55 years (red line in top middle plot), who tend to
do quite poorly when not lying.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explored the behaviour and char-
acteristics of users in a major Porn 2.0 social network. Our
focus has been on understanding the roles of age and gender,
exploiting state-of-the-art algorithms to detect users who lie
about these features: so called “catfishes”. To achieve our goal,
we built classifiers for gender and age estimation. Using this,
we predict that 25% and 38% of unverified users on PornHub
are likely lying about their gender and age respectively. We
found that women actually have a greater propensity to lie
than men. The two genders tend to select different ages when
catfishing, though. Whereas men pretending to be women
usually select younger ages, women pretending to be men
select from a wider range. Our analysis also reveals that
male users frequently benefit from such lies, and obtain larger
numbers of views and friends. The opposite is the case for
women pretending to be men, confirming that their motives
go beyond the acquisition of attention.
This work is just the first step towards understanding the
nature of online catfishing. Here, we have only explored
deception related to age and gender. Our future work will
expand this to understand how some users lie about other
attributes such as location and interests. We also plan to use
machine learning to better model the similarities between some
male and female accounts (e.g., based on viewing histories and
browsing patterns [30]). A key priority is corroborating our
findings via ground truth information from surveys and ques-
tionnaires. This is, of course, because it is currently impossible
to gain definitive data beyond the verified profiles – our
method is, thus, underpinned by the assumption that there is
limited catfishing related to gender and age in verified profiles.
Although not ideal, we argue this is the only significant dataset
to allow such exploration; further, although noise may exist,
the PornHub verification process has proven highly effective
overall. We also assume that the true underlying attributes
of unverified profiles are broadly similar to that of verified
profiles. This, too, needs to be tested using other methods
such as surveys. That said, we remain confident that the state-
of-the-art techniques employed here are accurate enough to
underpin our findings. Finally, we wish to understand why
users choose to lie, and how individual users strategise this
deception. Again, we plan to execute this via surveys that can
garner deeper insight into such reasoning.
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